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Abstract. Special divine action is an integral part of the Christian worldview. 
In fact, the plausibility of the Christian worldview depends on and is grounded 
in the putative reality, and therefore possibility, of special divine action. 
Without special divine action, Scripture does not make sense, and without 
Scripture, Christianity neither. However, the possibility of special divine action 
is highly contested in almost every field of human enquiry. In what follows, 
I  briefly suggest a  minimal definition of special divine action and show its 
indispensability for the internal plausibility of Christian faith. I  then argue 
against the very possibility of special divine action. I end by way of identifying 
ways in which Christian theologians can respond to the arguments in order to 
justify the possibility of special divine action. It turns out that special divine 
action neither contradicts science nor metaphysics.
Special divine action is an  integral part of the Christian worldview.1 
In fact, the plausibility of the Christian worldview depends on and is 
grounded in the putative reality, and therefore possibility, of special divine 
action. Without special divine action, Scripture does not make sense, 
and without Scripture, Christianity neither. However, the possibility of 
special divine action is highly contested in almost every field of human 
enquiry. In what follows, I briefly suggest a minimal definition of special 
divine action and show its indispensability for the internal plausibility of 
Christian faith. I then argue against the very possibility of special divine 
action. I end by way of identifying ways in which Christian theologians 
can respond to the arguments in order to justify the possibility of special 
divine action. It turns out that special divine action neither contradicts 
science nor metaphysics.
1 Of course, in making this claim I do not wish to exclude the importance of special 
divine action for other religions like Judaism or Islam. Christian faith, though, is 
a particularly rich tradition concerning the analysis of special divine action.
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I. THE INDISPENSABILITY OF SPECIAL DIVINE ACTION
Here are some assumptions I take for granted: First, a state of affairs S 
is constituted by a particular p, a property F and a point of time t. The 
obtaining of S at t consists in p’s exemplifying F at t. Second, a possible 
world w  is a maximally consistent state of affairs. Third, the history h 
of a possible world w at t is the temporally ordered class of all states of 
affairs that obtain in w prior to and including t. A future f of a possible 
world w is the temporally ordered class of all states of affairs that obtain 
posterior to t. Fourth, the actual world @ is the only obtaining maximal 
consistent state of affairs. Fifth, as the purpose of this paper is to analyse 
the possibility of special divine action and not to argue for the existence 
of God per se, I assume that the existence of the actual world is contingent 
and presupposes an ultimate and supernatural ground of its existence 
that properly is referred to as ‘God’.2
General and Special Divine Action
I assume the following minimal definition of general divine action: G is 
a general divine action if and only if G is an action that God engages in 
at every moment of existence of the actual world. The very existence of 
the actual world, therefore, is the effect of God’s general action: out of the 
infinity of possible worlds, God chooses one world to be the actual world 
by way of holding it in existence at every point of time of its existence. 
Without God’s general action, the actual world would not exist.3 In 
contrast to general divine action, special divine action could, in a first 
attempt, be defined as follows: A is a special divine action if and only if 
A is God’s actualisation of a particular state of affairs S at some point of 
time t in the actual world.
However, based on the proposed definitions we obtain the following 
problem: if general divine action consists in God’s actualizing a possible 
world, then God is eo ipso causally responsible for the obtaining of each 
and every state of affairs S in the actual world. After all, a possible world 
2 Cf. Mautner (1996: 416). For an analysis of the different ways in which the term 
“God” is used, and for an  analysis of the structure of arguments for and against the 
existence of God, see Göcke (2013). For further analysis of the ontology of possible 
worlds cf. Göcke (2014a).
3 Cf. Kraay (2008) for an argument to the effect that God cannot be the creator of the 
world because God neither has a sufficient reason to create a particular world instead 
of another nor is able to rely on a randomizing device in order to chose which world to 
create.
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is nothing over and above a maximal consistent state of affairs: in order 
to actualise a possible world w, God has to actualise every state of affairs 
S that constitutes w. It follows that in the situation at hand the concept 
of special divine action is absorbed by the concept of general divine 
action. Occasionalism follows immediately since God would be the 
only acting agent.
In order to be able to distinguish between general and special divine 
action (and in order to avoid occasionalism), we have to find a way of 
understanding special divine action as something in addition to God’s 
general action of actualising every state of affairs that is part of the 
actual world. To do so, we have to assume that God’s general action of 
creating the world is such that it bestows autonomy to the actual world, 
i.e. a tendency to stay in existence and to direct itself.4 More technically, 
although God’s general action holds the world in existence at every point 
of time, it is nevertheless true that for each point of time t of the actual 
world, there is a future f of @ that is accountable purely in terms of the 
history of @ at t.5
Based on the assumption of an autonomous world, we can formulate 
the following minimal definition of special divine action: A is a special 
divine action if and only if A is God’s supernatural actualisation of a state 
of affairs S at t the obtaining of which was not entailed by the history h 
of @ at t, whereas S is not entailed by h if and only if there is a future f of 
the actual world in which S does not obtain. This definition is minimal 
because any account of special divine action – no matter which further 
conditions it imposes on special divine action – has to presuppose that 
a special divine action at least has the features suggested.6
Interventionist and Non-Interventionist Accounts of Special Divine Action
We can specify the relation between general and special divine action 
as follows: God’s general action is God’s creation of an  autonomous 
world, and if there is special divine action, then at least sometimes 
God supernaturally actualises a  state of affairs S at t the obtaining of 
which was not entailed by the prior history of the actual world up to 
4 This is, of course, what Thomas had in mind when he distinguished between primary 
and secondary causes. See, for instance, Thomas’ Summa Theologica, 1q 105 and Griffin 
(2014: 56/57)
5 For an analysis of occasionalism, cf. Perler/Rudolph (2000), Clayton (2008: 120) and 
Murphy (1995: 332).
6 Cf. Alston (1999: 185) and Schwöbel (1992: 36).
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and including  t. Like a  piano player whose left hand constantly plays 
the same chord, God’s special divine actions can be seen as his right 
hand adding now and then some fine tunes in order to create the overall 
melody of creation.
Recently a  distinction was introduced between so-called inter-
ventionist and non-interventionist accounts of special divine action. 
The distinction, however, is dim and hard to justify. It often seems to 
be entirely artificial. Here is why: non-interventionists suppose that the 
ontological gaps associated with some metaphysical interpretations of 
modern scientific theories, like chaos theory or quantum mechanics, 
provide a legitimate loophole for God to act in a way that is consistent with 
the development of the natural order itself.7 In contrast, interventionism 
is said to entail that God’s special actions are violations of the natural 
order of causes.8 This, though, only follows on the further assumption 
that interventionism, in contrast to non-interventionism, is committed 
to a deterministic interpretation of the natural order of causes.9 Without 
this assumption, the distinction between non-interventionism and 
interventionism collapses. Since interventionism is not committed to 
a  deterministic interpretation of the natural order of causes it follows 
that the distinction between interventionism and non-interventionism 
is without support. In fact, even if there was a substantial difference, both 
interpretations presuppose the suggested minimal definition of special 
divine action. On both accounts, a special divine action is a supernatural 
intervention in the actual world that actualises a state of affairs S at t the 
obtaining of which was not entailed by the history of the actual world up 
to and including t.10
The Indispensability of Special Divine Action for Christian Faith
Special divine action is indispensable for Christian faith. The Bible is 
full of references that depict God as actively involved in the history and 
fate of His people by way of actualizing particular states of affairs the 
obtaining of which was not entailed by the prior history of the world. Just 
to mention two prominent examples:
7 Cf. Wegter-McNelly (2009: 162-163).
8 Cf. Wegter-McNelly (2009: 161).
9 Cf. Ward (2007: 119).
10 Cf. for instance, Murphy (1995: 342).
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First, the separation of the Red Sea is described as follows:
Then Moses stretched out his hand over the sea; and the LORD drove the 
sea back by a strong east wind all night, and made the sea dry land, and 
the waters were divided. And the people of Israel went into the midst of 
the sea on dry ground, the water being a wall to them on their right hand 
and on their left. [...] Then the LORD said to Moses, ‘Stretch our your 
hand over the sea, that the water may come back upon the Egyptians, 
upon their chariots, and upon their horsemen.’ So Moses stretched forth 
his hand over the sea, and the sea returned to its wonted flow when the 
morning appeared, and the Egyptians fled into it, and the LORD routed 
the Egyptians in the midst of the sea.’ (Exodus 14, 21-27)
It is clear that in this passage God is described as engaging in special 
divine action: God actualises a  state of affairs  – the separation of the 
Red Sea – that otherwise had not occurred and that was not accountable 
for in terms of the history of the actual world up to that point of time. 
Furthermore, God did so on purpose, in order to save His people, and the 
impossibility of special divine action would destroy the very reliability of 
Scripture as a story of God’s loving relation to His people.
Second, assuming that the resurrection of Christ is the paradigmatic 
special divine action, the New Testament itself is as clear as one could 
wish that the possibility of special divine action is a necessary condition 
for the plausibility of Christian faith. As Paul argues:
Now if Christ is preached as raised from the dead, how can some of you 
say that there is no resurrection of the dead? But if there is no resurrection 
of the dead, then Christ has not been raised; if Christ has not been raised, 
then our preaching is in vain and your faith is in vain. We are even found 
to be misrepresenting God, because we testified of God that he raised 
Christ, whom he did not raise if it is true that the dead are not raised. 
For if the dead are not raised, then Christ has not been raised. If Christ 
has not been raised, your faith is futile and you are still in your sins. 
Then those also who have fallen asleep in Christ have perished. If for this 
life only we have hoped in Christ, we are of all men most to be pitied.’ 
(1 Corinthians 15. 12-19)
Paul explicitly states with logical rigour that without the resurrection 
of Christ, Christian faith is in vain and those who follow Christ are to 
be pitied.
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Therefore, since ‘from the call of Abraham and the Exodus from 
Egypt to the birth, ministry, death, and raising of Jesus and the founding 
of the church at Pentecost, God is represented as making new things 
happen’ (Russell 1998: 191) we can conclude that special divine action is 
an indispensable part of Christian faith itself: if special divine action is 
impossible, then there is no point in being a Christian at all.11
II. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF SPECIAL DIVINE ACTION
There are several arguments against the possibility of special divine 
action. In what follows, I  ignore basic arguments that are directed 
against the existence of God, or against the intelligibility of the very idea 
of a God acting in history. Although it is an important task for Christian 
philosophers to argue for the existence of God, I focus on arguments that 
show that even if there is no conceptual problem with an acting God as 
such, special divine action is nevertheless impossible.
The Argument from Causal Closure
The first argument against the possibility of special divine action is based 
on the assumption that the actual world is a causally closed system that 
excludes any non-physical intervention. Although there are different 
versions of causal closure discussed, the general idea is that the actual 
world is causally closed because every obtaining state of affairs S has 
a purely physical causal history that is responsible for S’s obtaining. As 
Clayton (2008: 135) says, ‘a basic assumption of many modern physicists 
is that physical systems are closed to causal interventions from outside 
(the principle of the conservation of energy).’12 In case of determinism, 
causal closure states that there is a sufficient physical causal history for 
every obtaining state of affairs. In case of indeterminism, causal closure 
‘would say that the chances of physical effects are always fully fixed by 
their prior physical histories’ (Papineau 2002: 17 FN).13
Since a special divine action is a supernatural, and therefore a non-
physical intervention in the actual world we obtain the following 
conclusion: if the actual world is causally closed, then special divine 
11 Cf. Cobb (1973: 207).
12 Cf. Papineau (2002: 17), Papineau (2000), Göcke (2008) and Lowe (2008).
13 Cf. Plantinga (2011: 92-93).
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action is impossible. It would be a supernatural actualisation of a state 
of affairs S the causal history of which was not completely physical. As 
it were, God pushed too hard on the autonomy of the actual world and 
created a world that at any point of time t has a future that is accountable 
for purely in terms of the world’s history. Therefore, since the actual world 
is causally closed, special divine action is impossible. As Saunders (2000: 
518) says: ‘The causally closed view of science in which every event leads 
to another seems to many to leave no room for God at all.’14
The Argument from Determinism
The second argument against the possibility of special divine action does 
not focus on the causally closed nature of the actual world. Instead it 
assumes that independent from whether a  supernatural intervention 
as such is possible, special divine action is impossible for quite another 
reason: it is impossible because the actual world is a deterministic world.
Determinism entails that there are no two possible worlds w  and 
w* that share the same history h at t but differ in respect to their 
future  f. In a deterministic world w, the history at t can be addressed 
as the sufficient cause of the future of w. As Schaffer (2007: 115) states: 
‘A  world w  is deterministic iff: for all times t in w, the total occurent 
history of w supervenes on the occurent state of w at t together with the 
laws of w.’15 Since a special divine action is God’s actualisation of a state 
of affairs S that was not entailed to obtain by the history of the world 
at any arbitrarily chosen point of its history prior to S’s obtaining, it 
follows that special divine action is impossible because the actual world 
is a deterministic world.
The Argument from Laws of Nature
A third argument against the possibility of special divine action is based 
on the assumption that the possibility of special divine action contradicts 
the intelligibility of the world because it contradicts the existence of the 
laws of nature – no matter whether these are thought of as deterministic 
or indeterministic. Although the discussion concerning the semantics 
and ontology of the laws of nature is far from being unanimous, Craver 
provides a  useful summary of some of the most important features 
14 Cf. also Pollard (1958: 12).
15 Cf. also Earman (1986: 13) and Laplace (1951: 4)
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of what the laws of nature are supposed to be. They are ‘(1) logically 
contingent, (2) true (without exception), (3) universal generalisations, 
that are (4) unlimited in scope and (5) hold by physical necessity’ 
(Craver 2007: 56-57). The laws of nature thus understood enable us to 
explain the past and to predict the future. They are what accounts for the 
intelligibility of the actual world.
However, if special divine action is possible, then no laws of nature 
can exist because in this case there is no exceptionless and true universal 
generalisation that accounts for the history and the future of the actual 
world. As a  consequence, the way the world works would remain 
unintelligible to us because God could intervene at arbitrary points 
of time in the future, and could have done so in the past. Therefore, if 
special divine action is possible, laws of nature are impossible. Since 
there are laws of nature, it follows that special divine action is impossible.
The Argument from Scientific Evidence
A  fourth argument is not directed against the possibility, but against 
the actuality of special divine action. It is based on the following 
assumption: if the obtaining of a state of affairs S at t is due to special 
divine intervention, then there has to be scientific evidence that S is 
due to divine intervention. There is no scientific evidence, however, for 
any kind of divine intervention in the actual world. As Papineau (2002: 
253) argues, ‘detailed modern research has failed to uncover any [...] 
anomalous physical processes. [...] If there were such [non-physical] 
forces, they could be expected to display some manifestation of their 
presence. But detailed [...] investigation failed to uncover evidence of 
anything except familiar physical forces.’ Therefore, based on the absence 
of scientific evidence, we have to conclude that there is no special divine 
action: if there was, science would by now have told us. As Clayton (2008: 
219) says, ‘scientific research has not provided evidence that God did, or 
does, bring about miracles in the natural world. [...] Worse, the basic 
methodology of science seems to stand opposed to even the possibility 
of such events.’
The Argument from Evil
A last argument against the possibility of special divine action is based 
on the assumption that there is a huge amount of unnecessary and thus 
purposeless evil and suffering in the world. However, if God exists and is 
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able to act in the world, and if God is omniscient, morally perfect, and 
omnipotent, then He is morally obliged to intervene in order to prevent 
unnecessary evil and suffering in the world. This, though, is not what 
we observe: God does not prevent unnecessary evil and suffering.16 The 
best explanation for this fact is that – for whatever reason – God simply 
cannot act in the world. If He could, He would. Therefore, given the huge 
amount of unnecessary suffering and evil in the world, it follows that 
God cannot act in the world.
There is no Point in Being a Christian
God cannot create a world that is self-directed while at the same time 
open to supernatural intervention. Even if He could create such a world, 
the apparent amount of unnecessary suffering and evil shows that for 
whatever reason God cannot act in the actual world in order to prevent 
unnecessary evil and suffering. Since the possibility of special divine 
action is an  indispensable part of Christian faith, there is no point in 
being a Christian.
III. SPECIAL DIVINE ACTION AND THE CHRISTIAN WORLDVIEW
In what follows I  indicate ways in which the above arguments can be 
criticised from a Christian point of view.17 A first and general point to be 
noted concerns the relation between special divine action and human free 
action, understood in a libertarian sense. Since apart from the argument 
from evil, each argument not only entails the impossibility of special 
divine action, but also the impossibility of libertarian free human action, 
it follows that any theistic metaphysics allowing for free human action 
also allows for special divine action. In a theistic paradigm, human free 
action is possible if and only if special divine action is possible.
Causal Closure Reconsidered
Although the causal closure of the actual world is an  often-met 
assumption in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of religion, it is by 
no means an uncontroversial assumption. First of all, causal closure itself 
is not a metaphysically necessary assumption, and it is neither a scientific 
16 Cf. Clayton (2008: 218).
17 Cf. Göcke (2014b).
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assumption: it is neither a consequence, nor a presupposition of science 
itself. Instead, it is a philosophical assumption that belongs to an atheistic 
and naturalistic worldview. Science might as a methodological restraint 
suppose that it should look for physical causal histories whenever it 
wants to explain the obtaining of a particular state of affairs, but as soon 
as scientists assume that it is a metaphysical principle that there can only 
be physical causes, they leave the realm of science and enter metaphysical 
territory. As Polkinghorne (2006: 67) argues, ‘it is clear that physical 
closure of the causal nexus of the world has not been established, so that 
claims that science has disproved the possibility of providential agency 
can be seen to be false. Belief in divine action is no more necessarily 
negated by an honest science than is belief in free human agency.’
Determinism Reconsidered
In order to refute the argument from determinism one has to show that 
the actual world is not a deterministic world. In order to do so, we can 
rely on two sources: first we can rely on arguments according to which 
human beings can engage in rational discussion. Since the very idea of 
rational argumentation presupposes that determinism is false, and since 
any argument for determinism presupposes the possibility of rational 
argumentation, it follows that determinism is transcendentally self-
refuting. Second, although there is an often-mentioned relation between 
classical physics and determinism, we can rely on recent developments 
in physics that presuppose that the actual world is an  indeterministic 
world: As Russell states, ‘the total set of natural conditions affecting 
some process [on the quantum level], and thus the total possible set 
of conditions which science can discover and describe through its 
equations, are necessary but insufficient to determine the precise 
outcome of the process. The future is ontologically open, influenced but 
under-determined by the factors of nature acting in the present’ (Russell 
1998: 203).
Laws of Nature Reconsidered
The discussion concerning the scope of the laws of nature often puts the 
cart before the horse. The only reason to assume that the laws of nature 
are exceptionless in respect to their predictive and explanatory power 
is that one yet already assumes that they are descriptions of physical 
processes in a  world devoid of freedom and intervention. Of course, 
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if right from the start one assumes that there can be laws of nature if 
and only if there is no freedom, then genuine interventions in the actual 
world that are not covered by the laws of nature would destroy the very 
plausibility of our understanding of the fundamental nature of the actual 
world. However, if we suppose that laws of nature are ceteris paribus 
descriptions of idealized systems the actual predictive and explanatory 
power of which depends on whether there is an  intervention, then 
the problem vanishes at once. Although there are laws of nature that 
regulate what happens in the actual world, not everything that happens 
is regulated by the laws of nature.18
Evidence Reconsidered
Although there is no positive scientific evidence that the obtaining of 
a certain state of affairs S is due to special divine action, there is neither 
scientific evidence that the obtaining of a state of affairs S* is due to free 
will. All this, though, is only a  problem if one assumes the following 
further principle: if there is no scientific evidence for p, then p does not 
exist. However, since this assumption is not a scientific assumption itself, 
and since there are no convincing arguments to adopt such a restrictive 
and positivistic philosophy of science, it follows that there is no need for 
the Christian to share it.
Apart from the fact that the absence of scientific evidence for special 
divine action is not sufficient to draw the conclusion that there is no special 
divine action, there is another reason according to which science could 
not even in principle provide evidence for special divine action: scientific 
research assumes that, by definition, ‘anything that can move a physical 
thing is itself a physical thing (although perhaps a strange and heretofore 
unstudied kind of physical thing)’ (Dennett 1991: 35). As Lowe states 
the same point, physics assumes that ‘anything which can exert a force 
on physical objects, that is, which can do work on a physical system, is 
ipso facto something “physical” and the force it exerts is consequently 
a  “physical” one. The very definition of the “physical” [...] is that it is 
something capable of exerting force, or equivalently of doing work or 
contributing energy to a  system’ (Lowe 1996: 61). If this is true, then 
by definition physics cannot discover anything that from a metaphysical 
point of view could be addressed as a special divine action.
18 Cf. Foster (1934: 465).
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Evil Reconsidered
The problem of evil is the most pressing one. Whereas normally the 
existence of evil and suffering is used to show that an  omnipotent, 
omniscient, and morally perfect being cannot be the creator of the 
actual world, our discussion of the argument is based on the assumption 
that such a  being exists. A  defence of the possibility of special divine 
action therefore has to show that either there is no unnecessary evil 
and suffering in the world or else has to show that there is no moral 
obligation to prevent the existence of unnecessary evil and suffering. 
Since it seems to be a conceptual truth that an omnipotent, omniscient 
and morally perfect creator of the world would prevent unnecessary evil 
and suffering – that is, suffering that serves no purpose at all – it seems 
plausible for the Christian philosopher to reject the assumption that 
there is unnecessary evil and suffering in the world.
If there is no unnecessary evil and suffering, then it follows that every 
occurring evil and suffering has a  purpose. Whereas some may argue 
that this is a cynical conclusion given the huge amount of suffering and 
evil in the world that appears to us to be without a purpose, the Christian 
philosopher can point out that in God’s providential plan no one, 
ultimately, suffers without a purpose. This seems to be an existentially 
tenable view of the world if the alternative is a naturalistic and atheistic 
worldview according to which people suffer without no purpose at all.
The Possibility of Special Divine Action
None of the arguments presented against the possibility of special divine 
action is decisive. The argument from determinism is not sound because 
science itself supposes that the world is indeterministic. The argument 
from laws of nature, the argument from evidence, and the argument from 
causal closure are not sound because they presuppose a philosophy of 
science that is attractive only for those yet already operating in an atheistic 
and naturalistic framework. The argument from evil supposes that there 
is suffering and evil without a purpose, an assumption that the Christian 
does not of necessity share. In sum, then, although there are prima facie 
sound arguments against the possibility of special divine action, none of 
the arguments is ultimately convincing. Christians can firmly believe in 
the possibility of special divine action without contradicting science or 
metaphysics.
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